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1 INTRODUCTION1
In this article, we address the question of UN sys-
tem reform from the perspective of food and food
security. If all the talk of improved global govern-
ance is to mean anything, then it must be seen to
have an impact in the area of food security.2 Food
is a fundamental human right, the subject of count-
less UN Conventions, Declarations, Compacts and
Resolutions. However, the right to food is still
routinely denied to at least 800 million people,
20 per cent of the population of developing coun-
tries.3 For many, the situation is getting worse
not better: not least for 16 million refugees, 26
million people internally displaced, and many
others facing hunger because of conflict (ICRC
1995). Furthermore, food security is exactly the
kind of multi-sectoral and multi-layered topic that
new forms of global government must be seen
to tackle.
In recent international conferences, the UN has
secured commitment to specific targets in the field
of food security, to be reached by the year 2000:
the elimination of starvation and death caused
by famine, and of iodine and vitamin A defi-
ciency; a substantial reduction of chronic hunger
and of under-nutrition among children; and a sub-
stantial reduction also in diet-related non-
communicable diseases.4 These targets will not
be met, especially in Africa. Even to come close,
however, will require more money, better spent,
in a new political and policy context. Here is
the challenge facing the UN. The agenda includes
how to maintain the growth of world food sup-
plies, manage a liberalizing food trade regime,
improve the management of humanitarian aid, and
deal globally with the social security implications
of chronic hunger and malnutrition.5
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2 For recent contributions on global governance, see Urquhart
and Childers 1990; UNDP 1994; Parsons 1995; Righter 1995.
The figures are from FAO! WHO 1992.
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In assessing the UN's capacity to meet the chal-
lenge, our starting point is a balance sheet of global
governance in the food area. We identify strengths
and weaknesses in the performance of the UN sys-
tem ort food security. The UN is good at advocacy
and its other strengths include technical coordina-
tion, information collection and dissemination, as
well as a substantial resource flow to the food and
nutrition sectors in developing countries. On the
other hand, the performance of the many different
UN agencies with an interest in the food sector is
extremely uneven and the politico-bureaucratic
problems are immense. There are serious problems
with the capacity of the system to agree, prioritize,
coordinate and follow through a small number
of key policy initiatives to reduce food insecurity.
The UN system has also yet to come to terms
with the challenge to its mandate posed by the
coexistence of poverty, food insecurity, political
instability and war.
The problems are well known and familiar from
other sectors. We find connections in the debates
about public administration, good government,
and the sociology of international politics, as well as
in the current debate on UN reform. We draw on
these sources to propose options for improving the
capacity of the UN system to deal with food and
food security issues. Many small improvements are
possible, including stronger coordinating bodies,
joint planning at the country level, and administra-
tive reform of UN agencies. However, more radical
improvement requires more radical change: the
UN mandate needs review, particularly in the area
of conflict; there are too many agencies; and there
are too many independent budgets. We would like
to see a focal point in the UN system for policy
determination and resource allocation for food
These are some of the targets of the International Conference
on Nutrition, held in 1992. The report of that meeting (FAO!
WHO 1992) also contains summaries of the targets agreed for the
Fourth UN Development Decade and at the World Sumnut for
Children. The latter, in particular, are more carefully quantified
and more plausible. For example, they call not just for a 'sub-
stantial reduction' of chronic hunger. but rather for a 'reduction
in severe as well as moderate malnutrition among under-five
children by half of 1990 levels' (ibid.: 41).
See e.g. Serageldin and Landell-Mills (eda) 1994.
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security. If the need for more unified political con-
trol over the UN system, and the need to give the
Secretary General greater executive authority, lead
to the creation of an Economic Security Council (see
Mahbub ul Haq in this volume), then food should
certainly be within its mandate.
To set the scene, we begin by noting that the UN
apparatus concerned with food and food security
issues is, if nothing else, certainly of a size and
complexity to match the importance of the prob-
lem. If the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World
Bank and the IMF, are included, at least 29 UN
bodies are directly or indirectly involved (Figure 1).
They include the UN Secretariat, the specialized
agencies (such as FAO, ILO and WHO), the funding
programmes (IFAD, UNDP, WFP, UNFPA,
UNICEF, World Bank, IMF), trade-related organi-
zations (UNCTAD, WTO), special UN bodies (UN
Centre for Human Rights, UN Centre for Social
Development and Humanitarian Affairs, UN Envi-
ronment Programme, UN Centre for Human Settle-
ments (Habitat)), 5 UN regional economic commis-
sions, emergency and relief agencies (DHA,
UNHCR), and research and training institutes
(UNU, UNITAR, UNRISD, INSTRAW).
The UN system has grown up 'like topsy'. Each
agency has its own mandate, constitution, govern-
ing body, funding arrangement and location. Deci-
sion making is coordinated, to some extent, by the
UN General Assembly and Security Council, and
by the Administrative Committee on Coordination
(ACC), which consists of the heads of the UN
agencies meeting under the presidency of the UN
Secretary-General. However, each agency has a
large degree of autonomy. Steps have been taken
recently to reduce the large number of ad hoc and
inter-agency coordinating bodies, and to stream-
line the coordinating role of the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC). The funding pro-
grammes have set up a coordinating mechanism,
the Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP),
to devise collaborative policies and action plans.
And an important UN General Assembly resolu-
tion (UN 1992) has been passed to improve
the coordination of UN system assistance at the
country level.
Despite these improvements, the complexity of the
system in the food security arena remains a cause
of wonder. For example, there are five bodies con-
cerned with food aid: the governing body of the
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World Food Programme, the Committee on Food
Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA); the FAO
Committee on World Food Security (CFS); the
Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal
(CSD), a Sub-Committee of the FAO's Committee
on Commodity Problems; the new World Trade
Organization; and the Food Aid Committee, a non-
UN body subsidiary to the International Grains
Council, charged with overseeing the implementa-
tion of the Food Aid Convention, the only legally
binding international agreement on food aid. In
addition, the ACC has a Sub-Committee on Nutri-
tion (ACC/SCN), which brings together nutrition
specialists from the different agencies, and which
also deals with some food aid issues. There is a real
danger, and not just in the field of food aid, that
because food security is 'everybody's business', it
will become 'nobody's business'.
It was partly to cut through this complexity, and
give greater political impetus to food security is-
sues, that the World Food Council (WFC) was
established by the UN General Assembly, follow-
ing a recommendation of the World Food Confer-
ence in 1974. This proved not to be successful, and
the Council has subsequently been disbanded. At
the final session of WFC in 1992, ministers agreed
that '...the Council has fallen short of achieving the
political leadership and coordination role expected
from its founders' (UN 1992).
There are many reasons for WFC's demise. The
Council's membership consisted only of Ministers
of Agriculture, who had no mandate to cover the
range of food security issues outside the agricul-
tural sector; the Council's role was a confused
mixture of general advocacy and action plans; its
meetings were insufficiently focused on monitor-
ing action programmes; its Secretariat was too
small; and there was lack of cooperation - even
resentment - from key UN agencies.
Between them, the many agencies with an interest
in food security are responsible for a large annual
flow of aid to the food and food security sectors in
developing countries. A recent paper estimates that
the average annual flow from UN agencies to nutri-
tion and related sectors, excluding agriculture, be-
tween 1987 and 1991, was around $US 5 billion, of
which $US 3 bn from the World Bank and $US 2 bn
from other UN agencies (ACC/SCN 1995). To
quote a specific example, 57 million people received
food aid from the World Food Programme in 1994,
Figure 1: UN bodies with an interest in food and food security
Agency Food Interest




UN Food production, food
Environment security and environmentally
Programme sustainable development
UNESCO Formal and informal education on
food issues
UNHCR Refugee nutrition (with WFP)
UNICEF Health and nutrition programmes
for children and mothers
UNITAR Training programmes in food
security and related issues
UN Regional Food security In regional
CommIss- economic and social policy
Ions (5)
UNRISO Research on food and other
issues
UNU Research on toad and other
issues
WFP Coordination of food aid policy
through CFA, supply of
developmental and emergency
food aid for food security
WHO Health and nutrition policy and
programmes
World Bank Macroeconomic and sectoral
planning and policy, programme





marketing, trade, food security,
nutrition
IAEA Irradiation of food products
IFAD Agricultural production, rural
development
ILO Employment and entitlement
programmes, social protection
IMF Macro-economic policy,
financing of food imports
INSTRAW Women and food security
UN Centre Food as a human right
for Human
Rights
UN Centre Food policy in the context of





UN General oversight, political
questions
UN Centre Food security and viable and
for Human sustainable settlements
Settlements
(Habitat)




in a resource transfer involving three million tons of
food (WFP 1995)
The UN has also produced many international
initiatives related to food and food security in-
cluding a number of international conferences: the
World Summit for Children, the UN Conference on
Environment and Development, the International
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Conference on Nutrition, the World Conference on
Human Rights, the International Conference on
Population and Development, the World Summit
on Social Development, and the forthcoming World
Food Summit, the Fourth UN Conference on Women
and the Second UN Conference on Human Settle-
ments (Habitat II), among many others (Figure 2).
Optimistically in our view, the Secretary-General
Figure 2: Some major UN initiatives on food and food securIty, 1974-1994
DATE ITEM
1974 World Food Conference (leading to establishment of World Food Council,
International Fund for Agricultural Development, FAO Committee on World
Food Security, reconstitution of WFP Governing Body)
1975 FAO Global Information and Early Warning System established
International Emergency Food Reserve established
1977 lEAD established
1978 FAO Regional Food Plan for Africa
1981 IMF Compensatory FinancIng Facility extended to cereals
1983 Broadened concept of food security adopted by FAO
1985 World Food Security Compact (FAO)
1988 World Bank Task Force Report 'The Challenge of Hunger in Africa: a call to
action' and initiation of World Bank food security studies in Africa
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the UN General Assembly
WFC Cairo Declaration and Programme of Cooperative Action
1990 World Summit for Children
1992 International Conference on Nutrition
Department of Humanitarian Affairs set up
UN Conference on Environment and Development
1993 World Bank Conference on Overcoming Global Hunger
World Conference on Human Rights
1994 International Conference on Population and Development
1995 World Summit on Social Development
Fourth UN Conference on Women
1996 World Food Summit
sees the series of international conferences as a '...
continuum. They are cumulative in their content
and the result of one influences the others' (Boutros-
Ghali 1995: 49).
A feature of some recent summits or other interna-
tional meetings has been to set global goals in the
food and food security sectors. For example, the
World Summit for Children set a series of targets,
including that of reducing child under-nutrition by
half of 1990 levels by the year 2000. Similarly, the
International Conference on Nutrition committed
itself to a number of targets, including eliminating
famine and famine-related deaths, as well as iodine
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and vitamin A deficiencies, by the same date.
Before turning to a balance sheet of UN perform-
ance in the fields of food and food security, it is
worth asking what might reasonably be expected of
the multilateral system. The UN system has tradi-
tionally been made up of agencies that formally
have responded to the wishes of member govern-
ments. There is much scope for the secretariats of
these agencies to take initiatives, but only in a few
recent cases has the system been prepared to chal-
lenge the principle of national sovereignty. Within
this constraint, we identify six kinds of task for
the UN system to undertake:
j Consensus-building, advocacy, moral persuasion
and target setting, as at international conferences.
ii Acting as a forum for the preparation and nego-
tiation of international treaties or conventions, for
example in the field of human rights, like the Con-
vention on Human Rights or the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, or in specific areas of policy,
like trade liberalization.
iii Technical coordination and standard-setting,
either by an individual agency or a group of agen-
cies. Examples might include standards for food
quality, definitions and methods of measurement of
under-nutrition, or dosages for micro-nutrient
supplementation.
iv Information collection and dissemination, for
example on world food supply, the extent of mal-
nutrition or chronic dietary disease.
y Coordination of action among agencies, both
national and international, and with bilateral
governments and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), for example on food and nutrition arrange-
ments for refugees.
vi The implementation of aid programmes,
whether capacity-building or direct resource trans-
fer, usually, but not always, in collaboration with
member governments and NGOs.
2 UN ACTION ON FOOD AND FOOD
SECURITY: A BALANCE SHEET
At first sight, it is easy to be critical of UN system
performance in the food and food security arenas:
lack of political commitment by governments in
developed and developing countries; too many
organizations, often with competing agendas; the
split between theBretton Woods institutions and
the rest of the UN system, resulting in confused
and conflicting policy messages and action pro-
grammes; excessive and politicized bureaucracies;
inadequately targeted resource flows; and moral
weakness in the face of an imperative need to over-
ride national sovereignty in special circumstances.
However, a more balanced assessment is necessary:
the UN system has strengths as well as weaknesses.
First, the UN has been an important agent in advo-
cacy for improved standards of nutrition and food
security. Some agencies, like UNICEF, have a
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particularly strong reputation in this field; but the
UN system more generally, through its conven-
tions, development decades, special international
conferences and General Assembly debates, has
helped to keep poverty and food insecurity as key
themes on the political agenda in the 1980s and
1990s.
Second, the UN system has been efficient in techni-
cal coordination and standard-setting in the food
and food security areas. Standards are never as
neutral as they appear, and the debates have been
both technical and political (for example, over the
role of food industry interests). Nevertheless, the
many technical committees of the UN agencies
have done an important job.
Third, the UN has made a contribution to the stand-
ardization and dissemination of basic data on food
and nutrition. Good examples are the FAO
AGROSTAT system of agricultural statistics, the
WFP's international data base on food aid
(INTERFAIS), the regular reporting of FAO's Glo-
bal Information and Early Warning System on
food shortages, and the monitoring by the ACC/
SCN of the world nutrition situation.
Fourth, the contribution of the UN to resource
flows to food and food security should not be
under-valued.
Ort the other hand, there is the more negative side
to the balance sheet.
First, the record of coordination among the UN
agencies is at best chequered. The split between
the Bretton Woods and non-Bretton Woods institu-
tions is particularly unfortunate. It has led to con-
flicting policy advice and to lack of integration
between aid instruments, for example food aid
and financial aid. The task of linking relief and de-
velopment (Maxwell and Buchanan-Smith (eds)
1994) has also so far proved beyond the capability
of the UN system.
Second, the quality of aid and operational perform-
ance of the UN agencies has been very uneven. hi
our view, the most effective agencies are character-
ized by decentralized structures, an action-oriented
organizational culture, appropriate investment in
research and analysis, and a commitment to advo-
cacy. Not many meet this standard.
Third, and more generally, the UN system has not
always been very good at agreeing a consensus on
how to tackle food and food security problems.
There has been a tendency to fudge difficult choices
that might disadvantage certain interests; or alter-
natively, to issue guidance at the level of generali-
ties. A good example comes from the Seventeenth
Ministerial Session of the World Food Council in
1991, which was asked to '...bring to the attention
of multilateral financial and development institu-
tions and bilateral donors the need for long term
support to integrated technology systems, linking
agricultural research, technology transfer/extension
and on-farm application ...' (WFC 1991). To which
organizations precisely was this message directed?
What precisely were they supposed to do differently
in the future? What activities were to be cut to
make room for new initiatives? And how was the
WFC to know whether or not different agencies
had responded? Statements like this are vague and
exhortatory, rather than precise and action-oriented.
There has been increasing criticism that the cost
involved in holding international conferences has
not been justified by subsequent action
Fourth, the UN system has been better at issuing
general statements of intent than it has at turning
these into actionable statutes with some legal force.
An example of the difficulty can be seen in the area
of food as a human right, a fast-growing area of
interest, but one which has so far not been able to
turn statements of ideal in international conven-
tions into precise changes of policy and action at
the country level.
Fifth, the UN has generally not been successful at
providing a forum for real international policy
negotiation. A good example is the future of food
aid, which, as noted, is being discussed outside the
UN, in the Food Aid Committee at the International
Grains Council. It is notable that there is as yet no
appointed forum where the implications of the
Final Act of the GATT Uruguay Round for a future
food aid regime, the working of the IMF Cereal
Financing Facility, and the future roles of WFP,
CFS, CSD and the Food Aid Committee can be
discussed together. It is hoped that the newly
established WTO can expedite discussion on this
matter.
Sixth, the politico-bureaucratic problems of UN
administration are immense, both within and
among agencies. Nobody who has witnessed the
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unsatisfactory way in which heads of UN agencies
are elected or selected, and the internal squabbling
over posts, budgets or ownership of initiatives, can
doubt that the UN system faces severe constraints
in this domain.
Last, and by no means least, there are genuine
problems with the mandates of the UN system,
particularly in cases of food crisis caused by civil
war or state failure.
The outcome of these various problems is at best a
missed opportunity for the UN system. Yet they
are not unexpected, and not irresolvable.
3 EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE
In order to explain the strengths and weaknesses
of the UN system in the field of food security, we
draw on four separate streams of argument: (a)
lessons from organization theory and public ad-
ministration about the difficulty of managing
multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary activities in
multi-lateral fora; (b) the debate about 'good gov-
ernment', democracy and political and operational
accountability; (c) the 'sociology' of international
politics and the question of how international re-
gimes emerge; and, more practically, (d) the debate
about UN reform.
(a) Organization theory and public
administration
The difficulties of managing food and food security
issues in the UN food system display many features
of the problems of handling multi-sectoral and
multi-disciplinary activities that have been proble-
matical in other areas: integrated rural develop-
ment, nutrition planning, national-level food secu-
rity planning, even multi-disciplinary farming
systems research (Crener et aI. 1984, Maxwell 1986,
Birgegard 1987, Field 1987). The goals are often
over-ambitious, with long chains of causality; there
is organizational overload, with unrealistic expecta-
tions of coordination between competing organi-
zations; and institutional hierarchies make it
difficult to be flexible, and to innovate.
The problems with food security management by
the UN system in many ways mirror the difficulties
experienced at the national level. One particular
feature common to both is the prevalence of vertically
organized 'role' cultures, which are particularly
ill-suited to collaboration. By analogy with the
management literature, the heads of UN agencies
can be seen as 'barons' who find it difficult to col-
laborate (Handy 1981, Ch 7). UN organizations also
tend to display the features of 'mechanistic', rather
than 'organic', corporate organizations, with mini-
mal real participation, planning concentrated at the
centre, vertical flows of information and command,
strict hierarchies and rigid job descriptions (R.
Murray 1992; P. Murray 1989, 1992).
Leadership is often a special problem. It is per-
ceived as being '...self-perpetuating by whatever
means, preoccupied with personal prestige and
egocentric towards authority' (Abbott 1992). Ex-
ecutive heads are structurally positioned at the top
of their organizational charts, often the only author-
ized channels of communication on policy and
administrative matters between governing bodies
and their secretariats. They are one of the major
emblems of their agencies. The personality, nation-
ality, politics and character of executive heads are
explored for their meaning in agency life. Executive
heads provide a juncture where feeling, in an offi-
cially sanctioned way, impacts on thinking.
Growth in the number of special task forces, of
cross-cutting meetings and of coordinating bodies
is a clear sign of an organizational culture in crisis:
the 'patch and mend' approach is usually not sus-
tainable. This is likely to be true even if each special
meeting can be thought of as a task culture activity,
which produces its own targets (as did the World
Summit for Children and the International Confer-
ence on Nutrition). The responsibility for devising
action plans to meet these targets is usually passed
back to national governments, where the action
plans overlap with each other, and where the or-
ganizational problems are simply replicated.
If the problems are familiar, so are the solutions.
The management literature talks of 'open systems'
that are user-centred with a high degree of partici-
pation, have flat hierarchies, enabling leadership
and low inequality: in short, of ' task' cultures,
rather than' role' cultures (Handy ibid.; R. Murray
ibid.). These lessons have been applied to food
security planning in the context of a process
planning approach:
'Integrated planning but independent imple-
mentation (no 'super ministries' or 'lead agen-
cies'); the importance of a bias to coordinated
action over planning ('start small and grow');
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the value of risk-taking and innovation ('pilot
projects'); and the importance of addressing
explicitly the need for new modes of organi-
zation in multi-disciplinary team work ('task
cultures not role cultures')
(Maxwell 1990: 6).
We return below to the question of what these
lessons mean for UN reform.
(b) Good government, democracy and
accountability
The 'good government' agenda overlaps with the
public administration debate on the efficiency, ac-
countability and transparency of government, but
also adds new elements in the realm of political
reform, including human rights (Moore (ed.) 1993;
Robinson (ed.) 1995). This is of particular relevance
to the UN system. The major donors have made
their aid conditional on these factors. In addition,
a progressively greater share of resources directed
to food and nutrition has been taken up by man-
made emergencies in which human rights are at
risk. For example, in 1994, two-thirds of WFP aid
was distributed as relief assistance, mostly in
man-made emergencies, with only one-third for
development: five years ago the reverse was the
case (WFP 1995).
The general debate on good government, democ-
racy and accountability has witnessed an important
shift from crude political conditionality, involving
punitive measures, to a more measured emphasis
on promoting improved governance through '...in-
cremental, small-scale measures in the form of
support for civil society associations, strengthening
the electoral process and promoting constitutional
reform' (Robinson 1995: 1). The measures taken
include training journalists, promoting a free
press, supporting human rights groups and NGOs,
providing election monitoring and assisting new
political parties. These measures are deliberately
intended to be a threat to Third World Govern-
ments who abuse human rights, or are corrupt
and undemocratic ... (they) can help those who
suffer under them' (IDS 1995).
The issue of good government has become acute
in conflict situations. Duffield (1994) has argued
that the proliferation of 'permanent emergencies',
usually linked to war and themselves reflecting a
failure or crisis in development, has imposed new
roles on the UN. He argues that, prior to the
mid-1980s, the UN seldom intervened to provide
relief in complex political emergencies without there
being an agreed cease-fire in advance. By the end
of the 1980s, however, an accepted form of inter-
vention was to negotiate access to affected popu-
lations through 'corridors of peace', with the UN
agencies concerned often devolving to NGOs the
responsibility for physical delivery of food and
other relief in affected areas. This erosion of
national sovereignty was further deepened during
and after the Gulf War, with the innovation of
using military personnel to protect a UN mandated
relief operation, as in Bosnia, Kurdistan, Rwanda
and Somalia. Thus, 'humanitarian assistance has
become closely integrated with the dynamics of
violence' (Duffield ibid.: 42).
This is difficult territory for the UN system, which
has conventionally respected the concept of state
sovereignty, in conformity with Article 2.7 of
Chapter 1 of the UN Charter (UN 1945). But this
Article also states that '...this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on "Action
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression"'. This provision has
assumed particular significance as man-made
emergencies have increased in incidence, scale and
duration, leading to the UN Secretary-General's
priority to the implementation of the concept of a
'development-relief continuum' in which peace-
making, peacekeeping, relief, rehabilitation and
development assistance are inter-related.6
The new mood has practical consequences. Thus,
the General Regulations of WFP were amended in
1992 to allow it to provide humanitarian relief
assistance at the request of the UN Secretary-
General instead of waiting for a request for such
assistance from a national government, which
might never come (WFP 1993); the World Bank has
taken a higher profile in political liberalization
(Robinson ibid.: 3); and there has been a lively
debate about the scope for UN intervention in long-
running political crises causing famine (Righter
1995; Parsons 1995; Gordon 1995).
These developments would seem to provide both
a theoretical and practical foundation for an
enlargement of UN system mandates and activi-
ties beyond the borders of sovereign states, in food
6 On this topic, see also Shaw and Hutchinson (eds) 1993,
Maxwell and Buchanan-Smith (eds) 1994.
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security and in other fields. There are important
links to be made with definitions of food security
which stress 'human dignity' (Oshaug 1985) or 'au-
tonomy and self-determination' (Barraclough and
Utting 1987) as defining characteristics, and, more
generally, with the growing literature on nutrition
and human rights (Eide et al. 1991).
(C) International regimes for food security
The evolution traced by Duffield has still not perco-
lated fully into official regimes for food security.
Most UN agencies were not set up to handle this
growing problem, and have not adjusted to the
changing face of food insecurity described above
(Crawshaw and Shaw 1995).
To assess the scope for progress, it is important to
understand how regimes come into being. A recent
contribution (Uvin 1994) examines the complex in-
terdependence of institutions generating the domi-
nant principles that govern approaches to world
food and food security problems. Uvin finds that
'the processes in each of the issue areas ... were
strongly biased towards the preferences of only a
handful of powerful states, foremost among them
the United States'. (ibid.: 283).
On the other hand, Uvin finds some room for
manoeuvre by international organizations: they
'were much more important than being merely the
reflection of powerful states' interests. They were
not only crucial in the creation, reinforcement and
change of international regimes, but they also often
were central actors in the concrete process' (ibid.:
284). However, Uvin finds the Bretton Woods
institutions to be the powerful actors rather than
the other UN agencies.
One important lesson to be learned is that the role
of the UN system, in food and food security issues
as elsewhere, is itself a policy 'regime', which needs
to be negotiated around the interests and prefer-
ences of the most powerful states. It is not a new
insight, of course, to argue that the weaknesses of
the UN system largely derive from the shackles
placed on it by the big powers. A good example is
the hobbling of the nascent WFP in 1961, which
prevented the new organization from handling
programme food aid for development purposes,
restricting it to direct distribution of project food
aid for development projects and emergency
operations (FAO 1985: 315). But can improved
UN system performance now be sold as being in the
best interests of the big powers as well as other
member states? The use of the UN agencies in recent
crises, from Iraq to Bosnia and Haiti, and in Africa
and the former Soviet Union, suggests that the
climate of opinion may be changing, but is this
a temporary expediency or is a permanent, new
regime possible?
(d) The debate on UN reform
Debate on UN reform is as old as the UN itself.
Many of the themes raised in the previous para-
graphs are reflected in the current literaZre. Sev-
eral themes have figured prominently in the debate.
A highly controversial theme concerns the limits
of the political and economic powers of the UN.
Recommendations have ranged from strengthen-
ing ECOSOC to become a 'one-world parliament'
(UN 1969), to the building up of an 'economic United
Nations' side-by-side with the 'political United
Nations', totally recasting all UN structures con-
cerned with development in order to constitute re-
gional and sub-regional development agencies or
enterprises, and setting up a world forum to deal
essentially with economic problems (Bertrand 1985).
More recently, the establishment of an 'economic
security council' has been proposed, with a focus on
sustainable human development, and a new
concept of 'human security', which combines free-
dom from fear with freedom from want (UNDP
1994; Mahbub ul Haq in this volume).
The need for stronger cohesive and coordinated
action throughout the UN system has been a con-
stant theme, for which a number of prescriptions
have been made, including: establishing a central
'brain' as a policy centre for development; identify-
ing one UN organization as the 'hub' of the UN
system's development work; creating a system-
wide computerized information system covering
the work and activities of all the UN agencies; and
establishing a common UN development service
(UN 1969).
A major UN General Assembly resolution was
passed in 1992 relating to the coordination of UN
system assistance at the country level (UN 1992),
which serves notice that the UN system must 'get
its act together'. The centre-piece of the resolution
is the call for the formulation of 'country strategy
notes' (CSN) by interested recipient governments
with the assistance of the UN system, under the
leadership of the UN resident coordinator. The CSN
would: be based on the priorities and plans of
recipient countries; ensure effective integration of
UN system assistance; and facilitate assessment
and evaluation of impact. A programme approach
is to be adopted, decentralization of decision
making to UN country offices encouraged, and
training provided to build up national capacity
and execution.
Leadership or the UN system is another vital and
touch-stone concern. A study by Urquhart and
Childers (1990) found the process of appointing the
UN Secretary-General '... a curiously haphazard
affair'. It recommended that an improved election
process should include: serious consideration by
governments of the necessary qualifications for the
post; a single seven-year term; cessation of the
practice of individual campaigning; agreed rules
concerning nominations and a timetable for elec-
tions; well organized search for the best candidates
worldwide; inclusion of women as candidates; high-
level consideration of candidates by governments;
and avoidance of an election or selection process
that would result in the appointment of the 'low-
est common denominator'. Concerning leadership
of UN specialized agencies and programmes, the
study recommended that the process of appoint-
ment should be 'demystified', with '... far more
imaginative and wider search procedures', single-
term appointments for a maximum of seven years,
and major improvements in the selection process '...
to ensure the highest standards and the most effec-
tive choices'.
Proposals have been made to 'de-politicize' the UN
specialized agencies, making them leading techni-
cal bodies in their respective fields, with non-voting
decision making procedures, or voting arrange-
ments that avoided either domination by major
donor countries or by consensus that would lead
to stalemate between developed and developing
countries, and a central financing of their activities
with coordinated programmes of action (Williams
1987). For the funding programmes, proposals
have included amalgamating them into one con-
solidated fund, with a common location and com-
mon intergovernmental governing body to main-
tain cohesion and common oversight (UN 1969;
Childers and Urquhart 1994).
The continuing rift between the Bretton Woods and
other agencies of the UN system has caused concern
that the former will be given the lion's share of aid
funding for macro-economic measures, with the
latter receiving decreasing funds for human re-
source development activities (SID 1991).
Despite its charter (UN 1945), and its leadership in
standard-setting on gender issues for the world as
a whole, the UN system is failing 'abjectly' as an
equal-opportunity employer (Urquhart and
Childers 1994). The preamble to the UN charter
affirms '...the equal rights of men and women...'.
Article 8 states 'The United Nations shall place no
restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to
participate in any capacity and under conditions of
equality in its principal and subsidiary organs'.
Fifty years after the UN charter was adopted, only
about 30 per cent of the of the professional staff of
the UN secretariat in New York are women, and
the pledge to fill 25 per cent of executive jobs with
women by this year is well below target. At the
senior decision making levels, the percentages are
absurdly low, despite recent progress; only five
(UNEP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP) of
the 25 principal UN agencies are headed by women.
This is particularly concerning given the pivotal
roles that women play in food and food security
issues.
4 PRINCIPLES FOR UN REFORM
Four main principles for reform of the UN system
in the food and food security sectors may be dis-
tilled from the above discussion.
First, pretty well any improvements, such as better
search and appointment procedures for UN agency
heads and changes in the voting system will repre-
sent a change to the international regime governing
the activities of the UN agencies. As such, they
will need to be negotiated internationally and will
have to be seen to conform to the preferences of the
major players. The UN itself can be one such player,
although it may not be very influential.
Second, the regime changes will need to take ac-
count of the changing political and geographical
context of food and food security problems, par-
ticularly the co-existence of war and famine, and
the growing consensus in favour of questioning,
and even removing, the sanctity of national sover-
eignty when circumstances so warrant.
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Third, organizational changes will be central to any
reform process, not only to tackle what we have
called the 'politico-bureaucratic' problems of the
UN system, but also to address explicitly the prob-
lems posed by the multi-disciplinary and multi-
sectoral nature of the food and food security prob-
lems. The recent focus on precise targets in food
and nutrition goes some way to meeting the need
for an objective-oriented task culture; however,
the UN system as a whole does not yet have the
organizational means to deliver the programmes
needed to reach the targets.
Finally, UN system reform in the food and food
security sectors should, of course, be seen in the
context of the agenda of wider UN system reform.
Any changes made will need to be consistent with
this wider process, including steps taken to remove
the barriers between the Bretton Woods and non-
Bretton Woods agencies, and to strengthen the co-
ordination of financial, technical and food aid.
There is also considerable support in the literature
for measures to increase the integration and coher-
ence of the UN system.
We see two main paths in applying these principles:
a minimum, gradualist or evolutionary option,
which might be called 'status quo plus'; and a more
ambitious option, involving major restructuring of
the UN system, revised mandates and new forms
of organization.
The minimum option would leave untouched the
basic structure of the UN system and its mandates.
It would focus on better coordination and integra-
tion of initiatives, on more precise policy and opera-
tional guidance, and on better implementation and
coordination of action programmes. The agenda
could include such items as: establishing food secu-
rity as one of the major standing items on the
agenda of the ACC; broadening and strengthening
the work of the ACC/SCN; providing a small per-
manent secretariat for the JCGP; including food
security as a common item in Country Strategy
Notes and in the coordinated work programmes of
UN agencies at the field level; making food secu-
rity a major goal in the policies and programmes of
the IMF, World Bank, WTO and UN specialized
agencies; strengthening coordination with bilateral
programmes, the private sector and NGOs; dis-
cussing and deciding on initiatives to be taken in
the UN General Assembly and the governing bodies
of the concerned UN agencies on the basis of
annual progress reports; and undertaking adminis-
trative reform, based on 're-engineering', to define
and replicate best-practice.
The more ambitious option would include the
steps proposed for the minimum option but would
also involve: systematic review of the mandates of
the various UN bodies, in order to give greater
prominence to food security and the human right
to food (including, where necessary, the right to
intervene in sovereign states); expanding but also
centralizing funding; and, perhaps most important,
strengthening the political control of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly and ECOSOC, and the executive
leadership of the UN Secretary General. These
arrangements would enable there to be a single
food security policy for the UN system, with
resources allocated to follow the policy across
the system according to the comparative advantage
of agencies.
Whichever option is followed, we believe it is nec-
essary to have a focal point on food security in the
UN system, certainly on technical matters, but
preferably also at the highest political level. The
experience of the World Food Council suggests
that there is little mileage in setting up a separate
institution without executive authority and with a
mandate which cuts across that of other bodies.
Nor, however, can a coordinating or supervisory
body reasonably be located in a single agency, like
the FAO, with restricted sectoral membership and
a limited sectoral mandate. One possibility, there-
fore, is art institution based within the UN proper,
perhaps within the ACC structure and reporting to
ECOSOC; another is to strengthen the coordinating
capacity of UNDP, as the UN's main development
agency; a third would be to establish a 'World Food
Security Council', as proposed, but not agreed, at
the World Food Conference in 1974 (UN 1975: 37);
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and a fourth, if the proposal to create an Economic
Security Council comes to fruition, would be to give
that body responsibility for food security as one of
its primary tasks. In all these cases, the focal point
will be more effective if it has a say in resource
allocation; and if it clearly has a mandate which
includes the Bretton Woods Institutions.
5 CONCLUSION
The UN Secretary-General has rightly argued that
'The world now produces enough food to feed its
population. The problem is not simply technical. It
is a political and social problem. It is a problem of
access to food supplies, of distribution and of enti-
tlement. Above all, it is a problem of political will'
(Boutros-Ghali 1993).
We agree. However, we also believe that a solution
to world food security problems requires improved
global governance. This too requires political will.
Improvements to the status quo can only be stop-
gap solutions. The evidence of the UN's strengths
and failures, and an exploration of the reasons
underlying observed performance, both suggest
that more radical change is the necessary route.
Action is urgent. Today's problems are already
pressing. Over the next 25 years, the world's popu-
lation will increase by 40 per cent and effective
demand for food by 55 per cent, according to the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI
1995). Furthermore, it must be a priority to raise the
nutritional status of millions of people who do not
have the purchasing power to buy all the food they
need. With the right policies and the right frame-
work of global governance, these needs can be met.
If not, the prospects for resource degradation, eco-
nomic and political crisis and human misery are
grim indeed.
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